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  The United States Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) has issued a Report and 
Order that codifies rules to preserve a free and open Internet for consumers. 
1 The Order 
concentrates on the relationship between end users and Internet Service Providers (“ISPs”), but 
also addresses how ISPs must treat upstream providers of content, applications and services.  
Judicial review whether the FCC has lawful jurisdiction to impose such network neutrality 
2 
obligations severely restricts any regulatory intervention. 
3
 
  Assuming the FCC may salvage some 
basis to proceed, the Commission would have the most difficulty attempting to impose network  
                                                 
1  Preserving the Open Internet, GN Docket No. 09-191, Report and Order, FCC 10-201 (rel. 
Dec. 23, 2010); available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-10-201A1.doc 
[hereinafter cited as Open Internet Order]; See also, Preserving the Open Internet, 24 F.C.C.R. 
13064 (2009); 74 Fed. Reg. No. 228, 62637 (rel. Nov. 30, 2009) [hereinafter cited as Open Internet 
NPRM]. 
 
2  Network neutrality refers to government mandated nondiscrimination, transparency and 
other requirements on ISPs designed to foster a level competitive playing field among content 
providers and to establish consumer safeguards so that Internet users have unrestricted access 
limited only by legitimate concerns such as ISP network management and national security.  See 
Rob Frieden, A Primer on Network Neutrality, 43 INTERECONOMICS REV. EUR. ECON. 
POL’Y, No. 1, 4-15 (Jan./Feb. 2008). 
 
3   See Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642 (D.C. Cir. 2010), available at 
http://pacer.cadc.uscourts.gov/common/opinions/201004/08-1291-1238302.pdf (FCC deemed 
unable to bar Comcast from interfering with its customers’ use of peer-to-peer networking 
applications, because the Commission failed to show how its claim of jurisdiction was reasonably 
ancillary to the effective performance of its statutorily mandated responsibilities)[hereinafter cited 




neutrality obligations for services that ride “over the top” 
4
  The FCC’s initiative responds to concerns about the behavior of ISPs in their capacity as 
first and last mile providers of Internet access and as intermediaries between consumers and 
sources of content, applications and services.  Empirical and anecdotal evidence 
  of ISP traffic transmission links that 
eventually reach end users.  While the FCC’s public interest mandate may support some consumer 
protection regulatory safeguards against anticompetitive and discriminatory conduct of facilities-
based ISPs, the Commission has no legal basis to regulate content providers and to meddle with the 
robustly competitive marketplace for content and services.  
5
                                                 
4   “In the Open System Interconnection (‘OSI’) model, layered network architecture for 
packet networks typically consists of seven layers: physical, data link, network, transport, session, 
presentation and application.  The model calls for the independent operation of the layers, and 
supports the interaction of various applications and equipment that is designed to address separately 
each layer in a product offering.  In the Transport Control Protocol (‘TCP’)-IP model, only four 
levels are used:  link (combines OSI physical and data link levels), network, transport and 
application (combines OSI session, presentation and application levels).  The functions supported at 
each layer are as follows: physical–represents electrical signaling, modulation, etc.; data link–
moves packets (also called ‘datagrams’) between hosts based on a protocol such as Ethernet, 
Asynchronous Transfer Mode, frame relay; network–defines how data is routed between hosts over 
one or several networks, often based on IP; transport–establishes the connection between two hosts, 
creating a ‘virtual’ network, often based on TCP or Universal Datagram Protocol; session–controls 
the setup and termination of communications sessions; presentation–defines the format of the data 
exchanged (e.g., text, graphic); application–defines how applications communicate with each other 
over the network (e.g., e-mail) using various protocols.” Communications Assistance for Law 
Enforcement Act and Broadband Access and Services, 19 F.C.C.R. 15676 n.181 ( 2004).  See also 
Joshua L. Mindel & Douglas C. Sicker, Leveraging the EU Regulatory Framework to Improve a 
Layered Policy Model for US Telecommunications Markets, 30 TELECOMM. POL’CY 136, 137 
(2006); Douglas C. Sicker & Lisa Blumensaadt, Misunderstanding the Layered Model(s), 4 J. ON 
TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 299 (2006); David P. Reed, Critiquing the Layered Regulatory 
Model, 4 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 281 (2006); Lawrence B. Solum & Minn Chung, The 
Layers Principle:  Internet Architecture and the Law, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 815 (2004); Richard 
S. Whitt, A Horizontal Leap Forward:  Formulating a New Communications Public Policy 
Framework Based on the Network Layers Model, 56 FED. COMM. L.J. 587 (2004).   
 prompted the 
 
5  Madison River Communications, LLC, 20 F.C.C.R. 4295, 4297 (2005) (small independent 
telephone company agreed to a $15,000 monetary forfeiture and consent decree agreeing not to 
block Digital Subscriber Link customers’ access to Voice over the Internet Protocol telephone 
services); Formal Complaint of Free Press & Public Knowledge Against Comcast Corporation for 3 
 
FCC to consider the need for enforceable rules to ensure that ISPs do not engage in anticompetitive 
behavior masquerading as legitimate network management, or otherwise reduce the positive 
spillover benefits accruing from Internet access. 
6
The marketplace of ideas available via the Internet is as vigorous and open as any medium 
of communications so long as facilities-based intermediaries cannot use the excuse of network 
management requirements to pursue anticompetitive and harmful strategies that interfere with the 
flow of traffic upstream from content sources and downstream to end users.  The FCC and other 
national regulatory authorities (“NRAs”) have acknowledged the different characteristics of 
network access vis-á-vis the content and applications that ride over ISP transmission links.  While 
the content and applications marketplace offers unlimited options, consumers may have only one 
or two viable broadband Internet access options. 
 However, no such evidence points to any 
dysfunction in the marketplace for content, applications and services available via the Internet.   
7
                                                                                                                                                             
Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 23 F.C.C.R. 
13028 (2008), rev’d, Comcast Corp., supra, n. 3. 
 
 
6  Spillovers refers to positive consequences, externalities in the economic vernacular, 
resulting from a specific transaction that benefits third parties.  See Brett M. Frischmann, Speech, 
Spillovers, and the First Amendment, 2008 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 301, 310-12 (2008). Brett M. 
Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257 (2007). 
 
7  See John B. Horrigan, Broadband Adoption and Use in America, Federal Communications 
Commission, Omnibus Broadband Initiative (OBI) Working Paper Series No. 1 (Feb. 2010), 
available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-296442A1.pdf;  The 
Consumer Survey found that 35 percent of adult Americans do not have high-speed Internet 
connections at home -- or approximately 80 million adults and 13 million children over the age of 
five. For the 65 percent with Internet access, the vast majority use a cable modem or Digital 
Subscriber Line connection. “The simple fact is that our broadband market is a duopoly. 
Nationwide, incumbent phone and cable companies control 97 percent of the fixed-line residential 
broadband market. When the mobile data market is included, the incumbent phone and cable 
companies’ nationwide market share only declines to 95 percent . . . .”  Inquiry Concerning the 
Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications Capability to All Americans in a Reasonable and 
Timely Fashion, and Possible Steps to Accelerate Such Deployment Pursuant to Section 706 of the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, as Amended by the Broadband Data Improvement Act, GN, 4 
 
  NRAs and national legislatures need to act with caution in their assessment of what should 
be done to preserve an open Internet, because statutory authority typically limits the degree of 
lawful regulation of Internet services.  The potential for anticompetitive and otherwise harmful 
conduct lies in the terms and conditions that ISPs can impose where a vigorously competitive 
marketplace for their services does not exist.  Facilities-based ISPs have both the incentive and 
ability to operate non-neutral networks that may not serve the public interest, particularly with 
respect to their ability to provide content origination and termination services facing limited 
competition coupled with the fact that end users typically rely on only one carrier to provide a 
single link to and from the Internet cloud. 
8
  The need to investigate and possibly remedy problems in the terms, conditions and nature 
of consumers’ access to the Internet does not provide the FCC with the basis for an unprecedented 
expansion of its regulatory wingspan to regulate content and applications that traverse networks.  
Ample case law supports the premise that the FCC has no basis to impede and regulate Internet-
mediated content and services.    The FCC has questionable authority even to remedy 
discriminatory and intrusive meddling of subscribers’ links to and from sources of content.  
Network neutrality objectives never have extended upstream to sources of content and software, 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
Docket No. 09-137, Comments of Free Press at 46 (Sep. 4, 2009) available at 
http://www.ncta.com/PublicationType/RegulatoryFiling /NCTA-Comments-11-12-09.aspx. 
 
8  The Internet cloud refers to the vast array of interconnected networks that make up the 
Internet and provide users with seamless connectivity to these networks and the content available 
via these networks.   “The increasing functionality of the Internet is decreasing the role of the 
personal computer. This shift is being led by the growth of ‘cloud computing’--the ability to run 
applications and store data on a service provider’s computers over the Internet, rather than on a 
person's desktop computer.”  William Jeremy Robison, Free at What Cost?: Cloud Computing 
Privacy Under The Stored Communications Act, 98 GEO. L.J. 1195, 1199 (April, 2010). 
 5 
 
because consumers have ample options, subject only to the constraints imposed by ISPs in their 
capacity as intermediaries and operators of the sole means for end users to access the Internet.  
  The often contentious network neutrality debate typically cleaves along an absolute for-or-
against dichotomy based largely on one’s philosophy about the Internet’s past and future direction, 
the ability of marketplace forces to promote self-regulation and the degree of confidence in 
governments’ ability to remedy acute problems.  Thoughtful scholarly literature, which can 
examine nuances in the debate, has become subordinate to sponsored research designed to 
influence policymakers with a preconceived point of view.  A “big picture” analysis ironically 
leads to viewpoints at polar opposites and advocacy that finds no middle ground. 
  The issue of whether the Internet requires some degree of government oversight, dispute 
resolution and stewardship requires serious consideration, rather than sloganeering and dueling 
web pages. 
9
                                                 
9  Compare Save the Internet Home Page, 
 An essential element for such analysis breaks down the Internet into at least three 
layers having different characteristics that can affect the arguments for or against the application of 
network neutrality rules.  A physical layer provides the infrastructure needed to establish a basic 
communications link between two or more parties.  Ridding on top of this basic bitstream 
transmission conduit are communications protocols and standards like the Transmission Control 
Protocol that manage the routers that select networks to carry traffic and the Internet Protocol that 
establishes a globally used addressing system.  Farther atop the physical layer and the layers that 
set up and process transmissions are the content, applications and software that provide various 
services. 
http://www.savetheinternet.com/ with Net 





  This paper will consider the network neutrality debate in the context of these three different 
layered components of the Internet.  The paper  will show that compelling arguments for 
enforceable network neutrality rules are strongest at the low layer, contestable at the middle layer 
and unnecessary at the high layer.  Such a nuanced view of network neutrality explains that the 
need for government involvement depends on which part of the Internet’s networking 
infrastructure one examines.  For those comfortable with government involvement and network 
neutrality rules, this paper will challenge the need for such oversight in the competitive 
marketplace for Internet-mediated content, applications and software.  For others uncomfortable 
with any government involvement, this paper will identify instances where market failure and the 
lack of competition necessitate the availability of an authorized referee to require fair dealing by a 
limited number of operators providing Internet access.  In the middle layers, where ISPs not only 
use protocols and technologies to manage their networks, but possibly also to favor corporate 
affiliates and certain third party providers of content, this paper suggests the need for a government 
referee authorized to resolve disputes and to examine causes of congestion and service 
interruptions.   
I.  A Controversial Extension of Regulatory Oversight 
Ostensibly structured to offer an acceptable compromise the FCC’s Open Internet Order 
imposes basic network neutrality obligations on ISPs 
10 with qualified exceptions made for 
reasonable network management, 
11 specialized services 
12 and wireless broadband access. 
13
                                                 
10   Specifically the FCC imposes rules on the providers of broadband Internet access service, 
defined as a “mass-market retail service by wire or radio that provides the capability to transmit 
data to and receive data from all or substantially all Internet endpoints, including any capabilities 
that are incidental to and enable the operation of the communications service, but excluding dial-up 
Internet access service.  This term also encompasses any service that the Commission finds to be 
providing a functional equivalent of the service described in the previous sentence, or that is used 
to evade the protections set forth in this Part.” Open Internet Order at ¶44. 
   7 
 
The transparency requirement obligates all ISPs to disclose their network management 
practices, performance characteristics and terms and conditions of their broadband services. 
14
The FCC adopted different requirements for fixed and mobile broadband providers on the other 
two key requirements.  Fixed providers may not block lawful content, applications, services, or 
non-harmful devices while mobile broadband providers may not block access to lawful websites, 
or applications that compete with their voice or video telephony services. 
  
15
                                                                                                                                                             
11   “A network management practice is reasonable if it is appropriate and tailored to achieving 
a legitimate network management purpose, taking into account the particular network architecture 
and technology of the broadband Internet access service.” Id. at ¶82. 
 On the other key 
12   “‘[S]pecialized services,’ such as some broadband providers’ existing facilities-based VoIP 
and Internet Protocol-video offerings, differ from broadband Internet access service . . ..” Id. at 
¶112. “We will closely monitor the robustness and affordability of broadband Internet access 
services, with a particular focus on any signs that specialized services are in any way retarding the 
growth of or constricting capacity available for broadband Internet access service.  We fully expect 
that broadband providers will increase capacity offered for broadband Internet access service if 
they expand network capacity to accommodate specialized services.  We would be concerned if 
capacity for broadband Internet access service did not keep pace.  We also expect broadband 
providers to disclose information about specialized services’ impact, if any, on last-mile capacity 
available for, and the performance of, broadband Internet access service.  We may consider 
additional disclosure requirements in this area in our related proceeding regarding consumer 
transparency and disclosure.” Id. at ¶114. 
 
13   Despite the likelihood that wireless network access will grow and perhaps become the 
primary way people access the Internet, the FCC established relaxed anti-blocking rules based on 
spectrum and operational limitations not applicable to wire-based networks. “A person engaged in 
the provision of mobile broadband Internet access service, insofar as such person is so engaged, 
shall not block consumers from accessing lawful websites, subject to reasonable network 
management; nor shall such person block applications that compete with the provider’s voice or 
video telephony services, subject to reasonable network management.” Id. at ¶99. 
14   Id. at ¶1.  “A person engaged in the provision of broadband Internet access service shall 
publicly disclose accurate information regarding the network management practices, performance, 
and commercial terms of its broadband Internet access services sufficient for consumers to make 
informed choices regarding use of such services and for content, application, service, and device 
providers to develop, market, and maintain Internet offerings.” Id. at ¶54. 
15   “A person engaged in the provision of fixed broadband Internet access service, insofar as 
such person is so engaged, shall not block lawful content, applications, services, or non-harmful 
devices, subject to reasonable network management.” Id. at ¶63. 
 8 
 
requirement fixed broadband providers may not unreasonably discriminate in transmitting lawful 
network traffic while mobile carriers face a general no blocking rule that guarantees end users’ 
access to the web and protects against mobile broadband providers’ blocking applications that 
compete with their other primary service offering—voice and video telephony. 
16
  The Open Internet Order rejects assertions that network neutrality requirements would 
stifle innovation, reduce incentives to invest in network infrastructure and reduce employment in 
the Internet economy:  
   
We believe these rules, applied with the complementary principle of 
reasonable network management, will empower and protect 
consumers and innovators while helping ensure that the Internet 
continues to flourish, with robust private investment and rapid 
innovation at both the core and the edge of the network.  This is 
consistent with the National Broadband Plan goal of broadband 
access that is ubiquitous and fast, promoting the global 




In light of strident dissents from the two Republican Commissioners, the Open Internet 
Order appears to emphasize that the final rules logically follow from the nonpartisan consensus 
reached in 2005, 
18 and do not violate the Constitution,
19
                                                 
16   Id. at ¶99. 
 particularly First Amendment expression 
 
17   Id. at ¶1. 
 
18   “The rules we proposed in the Open Internet NPRM and those we adopt today follow 
directly from the Commission’s bipartisan Internet Policy Statement, adopted unanimously in 2005 
and made temporarily enforceable for certain broadband providers in 2005 and 2007; openness 
protections the Commission established in 2007 for users of certain wireless spectrum; and a notice 
of inquiry in 2007 that asked, among other things, whether the Commission should add a principle 
of nondiscrimination to the Internet Policy Statement.  Our rules build upon these actions, first and 
foremost by requiring broadband providers to be transparent in their network management 
practices, so that end users can make informed choices and innovators can develop, market, and 
maintain Internet-based offerings.  The rules also prevent certain forms of blocking and 
discrimination with respect to content, applications, services, and devices that depend on or 
connect to the Internet.” Id. at ¶5(citations omitted). 
 9 
 
rights of ISPs and the Fifth Amendment  prohibition on government confiscation of property 
without compensation.   
Additionally the Open Internet Order extensively attempts to demonstrate that the FCC has 
lawful jurisdiction to promulgate network neutrality rules, primarily because Congress, in Section 
706 of the Telecommunications Act, authorized the Commission to take all reasonable steps to 
promote widespread access to the Internet. 
20 In light of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals reversal 
of the FCC’s sanctioning Comcast for violating network neutrality principles, the Commission 
must establish clear and direct statutory authority to impose new rules.  The Commission heavily 
relies on Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act which does not explicitly authorize 
regulation and rule making.  The FCC infers that the duty to encourage the deployment of 
“advanced telecommunications capability” authorizes the Commission to use whatever tools it 
considers necessary to achieve timely progress. 
21
The assumption of statutory authority requires two novel reinterpretations of the definition 
for telecommunications contained in the Communications Act, as amended.  First, the FCC has to 
consider advanced telecommunications capability to include Internet access, 
   
22
                                                                                                                                                             
19   See Id. at ¶¶138-150. 
 despite having 
 
20   See Id. at ¶¶115-137. 
 
21   “As noted, Section 706 of the 1996 Act directs the Commission (along with state 
commissions) to take actions that encourage the deployment of ‘advanced telecommunications 
capability.’  . . . Under Section 706(a), the Commission must encourage the deployment of such 
capability by ‘utilizing, in a manner consistent with the public interest, convenience, and 
necessity,’ various tools including “measures that promote competition in the local 
telecommunications market, or other regulating methods that remove barriers to infrastructure 
investment.”
 Id. at ¶117. 
 
22   “‘[A]dvanced telecommunications capability,’” as defined in the statute, includes 
broadband Internet access.” Id. at ¶¶117, citing 47 U.S.C. § 1302(d)(1) (defining “advanced 
telecommunications capability” as “high-speed, switched, broadband telecommunications 10 
 
previously concluded that the technologies providing such access constitute an insignificant factor 
when the Commission determined that cable modem service fit within the information service 
classification. 
23  Second, the FCC now has to elevate the significance of the telecommunications 
bit transmission function in Internet access 
24 to trigger public interest concerns about competition 
and anticompetitive practices having previously subordinated it so that the Commission could 
provide an unregulated “safe harbor” for all Internet access technologies including cable modem 
service, 
25 Digital Subscriber  Lines, 
26 Broadband over Power Lines 
27 and wireless services. 
28
                                                                                                                                                             
capability that enables users to originate and receive high-quality voice, data, graphics, and video 
telecommunications using any technology”); National Broadband Plan for our Future, Notice of 
Inquiry, 24 FCC Rcd 4342, 4309, App. para. 13 (2009) (“advanced telecommunications 
capability” includes broadband Internet access); Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Advanced 
Telecomms. Capability to All Americans in a Reasonable and Timely Fashion, 14 F.C.C.R. 2398, 
2400 (Section 706 addresses “the deployment of broadband capability”).    
 
 
23   See Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 977–78 
(2005)[hereinafter cited as Brand X]. 
 
24   Note that before the FCC deregulated Internet access, the Commission considered it 
possible to separate the telecommunications component: “We conclude that advanced services are 
telecommunications services. The Commission has repeatedly held that specific packet-switched 
services are ‘basic services,’ that is to say, pure transmission services. xDSL and packet switching 
are simply transmission technologies. . . . An enduser may utilize a telecommunications service 
together with an information service, as in the case of Internet access. In such a case, however, we 
treat the two services separately: the first service is a telecommunications service (e.g., the xDSL-
enabled transmission path), and the second service is an information service, in this case Internet 
access.” Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced Telecommunications Capability, 
Memorandum Opinion and Order, and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 13 F.C.C.R. 24012, 24029-
30 (1998). 
 
25   Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and Other Facilities, 17 
F.C.C.R. 4798 (2002), affirmed sub nom. Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet 
Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 977–78 (2005). 
 
26   Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet Over Wireline Facilities, 
Report and Order  and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 20 F.C.C.R. 14853 (2005) pet.  for 
review den.,  Time Warner Telecom, Inc. v. FCC, 507 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2007). 
 11 
 
Now the FCC wants to validate the telecommunications component as the driver for public interest 
regulatory safeguards.  
Despite having previously concluded that the broadband marketplace was robustly 
competitive and close to ubiquitous, the Commission now cites to more recent market penetration 
data to support its involvement: 
Section 706(b) of the 1996 Act provides additional authority to take 
actions such as enforcing open Internet principles.  It directs the 
Commission to undertake annual inquiries concerning the availability of 
advanced telecommunications capability to all Americans and requires 
that, if the Commission finds that such capability is not being deployed in 
a reasonable and timely fashion, it “shall take immediate action to 
accelerate deployment of such capability by removing barriers to 
infrastructure investment and by promoting competition in the 
telecommunications market.”  In July 2010, the Commission “conclude[d] 
that broadband deployment to all Americans is not reasonable and timely” 
and noted that “[a]s a consequence of that conclusion,” Section 706(b) was 
triggered.  Section 706(b) therefore provides express authority for the pro-
investment, pro-competition rules we adopt today. 
29
 
   
Additionally the FCC invokes elements of Title II, III and Title VI of the Communications 
Act of 1934, as amended, to authorize regulation of ISPs even though they qualify for the largely 
unregulated statutory classification of information service providers and not telecommunications 
service providers for which Title II applies. Instead of stating that ISPs operate as 
telecommunications service carriers when they provide essential first and last mile access to the 
                                                                                                                                                             
27   United Power Line Council’s Petition for Declaratory Ruling Regarding the Classification 
of Broadband Over Power Line Internet Access Service as an Information Service, Memorandum 
Opinion and Order, 21 F.C.C.R. 13281 (2006). 
 
28   Appropriate Regulatory Treatment for Broadband Access to the Internet Over Wireless 
Networks, WT Docket No. 07-53, Declaratory Ruling, 22 F.C.C.R. 5901(2007). 
 
29   Open Internet Order at ¶123. 
 12 
 
Internet—a scenario suggested by FCC Chairman Julius Genachowski  
30
The FCC justifies imposing network neutrality rules on ISPs based on the Commission’s 
conclusion that ISPs have the incentive and ability to engage in anticompetitive practices that limit 
Internet openness in terms of content, applications, services and devices accessed over, or 
connected to broadband Internet access service. The Commission provides three examples 
suggesting that ISPs may have incentives to block or degrade content that competes with that 
offered by the ISP or an affiliate, to impose surcharges on competing content providers in addition 
to end user subscription fees and to degrade competitors’ traffic: 
 and now apparently 
rejected—the Open Internet Order states that because some Internet-based services compete with 
traditional telephone, broadcast and video services, the Commission has jurisdiction to impose 
rules and regulations to prevent anticompetitive practices and to promote competition. 
1)  “[B]roadband providers may have economic incentives to block or otherwise disadvantage 
specific edge providers or classes of edge providers, for example by controlling the transmission of 
network traffic over a broadband connection, including the price and quality of access to end users.  
A broadband provider might use this power to benefit its own or affiliated offerings at the expense 
of unaffiliated offerings.” 
31
                                                 
30   FCC Chairman Julius Genachowski, The Third Way:  A Narrowly Tailored Broadband 
Framework (May 6, 2010), available at 
 
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-
297944A1.doc (proposing to apply Title II regulation only to the bit transmission portion of ISP 
services and rejecting a renewed attempt to find a way to extend Title I ancillary jurisdiction or 
reclassifying all aspects of Internet access as a telecommunications service); Austin Schlick, FCC 
General Counsel, A Third-Way Legal Framework for Addressing the Comcast Dilemma (May 6, 
2010) available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-297945A1.doc 
(providing legal rationale for narrow application of selected sections of Title II regulatory authority 
over Internet access). 
 
31   Open Internet Order at ¶21. 
 13 
 
2)  “[B]roadband providers may have incentives to increase revenues by charging edge 
providers, who already pay for their own connections to the Internet, for access or prioritized 
access to end users.  Although broadband providers have not historically imposed such fees, they 
have argued they should be permitted to do so. A broadband provider could force edge providers to 
pay inefficiently high fees because that broadband provider is typically an edge provider’s only 
option for reaching a particular end user. Thus broadband providers have the ability to act as 
gatekeepers.” 
32
3)  “[I]f broadband providers can profitably charge edge providers for prioritized access to end 
users, they will have an incentive to degrade or decline to increase the quality of the service they 
provide to non-prioritized traffic.  This would increase the gap in quality (such as latency in 
transmission) between prioritized access and non-prioritized access, induce more edge providers to 
pay for prioritized access and allow broadband providers to charge higher prices for prioritized 
access.  Even more damaging, broadband providers might withhold or decline to expand capacity 
in order to “squeeze” non-prioritized traffic, a strategy that would increase the likelihood of 
network congestion and confront edge providers with a choice between accepting low-quality 
transmission or paying fees for prioritized access to end users. 
 
33
  The FCC considers the three examples of discrimination as more than theoretical in light of 
actual examples where ISPs, such as Comcast, blocked or degraded traffic without legitimate 
 
                                                 
32   Id. at ¶24. 
 
33   Id. at ¶29.  
 14 
 
network management concerns.  Similarly the Commission states that the benefits in guarding 
against such anticompetitive practices outweighs the costs. 
34
  II.  Absent a New Legislative Mandate, the FCC Lacks Certain Jurisdiction to  
    Regulate All Layers of Internet-Mediated Services. 
 
 
Throughout the FCC’s comprehensive explanation of how the Internet has become a 
successful medium of communication, along with the Commission’s efforts to promote access, the 
FCC has concentrated on the relationship of end users upstream to the Internet cloud via facilities-
based ISPs: 
The rules we propose today address users’ ability to access the 
Internet and are not intended to regulate the Internet itself or create a 
different Internet experience from the one that users have come to 
expect.  Instead, our proposals attempt to build on existing 
policies  . . . that have contributed to the Internet’s openness without 





Wisely, the FCC has left the application and content layers essentially unregulated.  This has 
helped enable an incredible outpouring of innovation and creativity online. 
However, as part of its Open Internet NPRM, the FCC asked whether it should depart from 
this approach and apply openness principles to Internet content and applications as well.  The FCC 
cannot lawfully extend its regulatory wingspan to impose enforceable rules and regulation for two 
                                                 
34   “By comparison to the benefits of these prophylactic measures, the costs associated with 
the open Internet rules adopted here are likely small. Broadband providers generally endorse 
openness norms—including the transparency and no blocking principles—as beneficial and in line 
with current and planned business practices (though they do not uniformly support rules making 
them enforceable) Even to the extent rules require some additional disclosure of broadband 
providers’ practices, the costs of compliance should be modest.” Id. at ¶39. 
 
35   Open Internet NPRM, 24 F.C.C.R. at 13068. “Broadband Internet access service providers 
have an incentive to use this gatekeeper role to make it more difficult or expensive for end users to 
access services competing with those offered by the network operator or its affiliates.”  Id. at 




primary reasons.  First, the D.C. Circuit Court’s opinion in Comcast Corp. v. FCC severely limits 
any extension of ancillary jurisdiction  
36 toward Internet-mediated information services,  
37
Operators at the network level provide an essential link between ends users and sources of 
content and applications.  Consumers generally have limited options available and typically select 
one and only one operator to provide all access services.  The lack of competitive options, coupled 
 despite 
evidence of congressional intent and a broad public interest mandate that may support reasonable 
efforts to promote consumer freedom by overseeing the conduct of facilities-based ISPs.  Second, 
any residual legal or policy rationale for regulating ISPs that survives the Comcast decision does 
not apply to content and application providers.   
                                                 
36   The FCC relies on a claim of ancillary jurisdiction when the Commission lacks explicit 
statutory authority.  The FCC successfully invoked ancillary jurisdiction to regulate cable 
television even before the Commission received a statutory mandate to do so.  “The FCC needed a 
hook to assert jurisdiction over cable.  To reach that goal, it used a two-step process.  First, the 
Commission found that cable was within its primary statutory grant of authority under section 
152(a) of the [Communications] Act, which allows the FCC to regulate ‘all interstate and foreign 
communication by wire or radio.’  Second, the FCC invoked section 303(r) of the Act, which 
allows the Commission to issue ‘such rules and regulations and prescribe such restrictions and 
conditions, not inconsistent with law,’ as ‘public convenience, interest, or necessity requires.’  The 
FCC also referenced section 154(i), which provides that ‘[t]he Commission may perform any and 
all acts, make such rules and regulations, and issue such orders, not inconsistent with [the 
Communications Act], as may be necessary in the execution of its functions.’  Kevin Werbach, Off 
the Hook, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 535, 572 (Mar. 2010) (citations omitted).  The Supreme Court 
affirmed the FCC’s claim of ancillary jurisdiction.  United States v. Sw. Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 
(1968).  See also FCC v. Midwest Video Corp. (Midwest Video II), 440 U.S. 689 (1979); United 
States v. Midwest Video Corp. (Midwest Video I), 406 U.S. 649 (1972); James B. Speta, The 
Shaky Foundations of the Regulated Internet, 8 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 101 (Winter 2010); 
John Blevins, Jurisdiction as Competition Promotion: A Unified Theory of the FCC’s Ancillary 
Jurisdiction, 36 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 585 (Summer 2009);
  Andrew Gioia, FCC Jurisdiction Over 




37   Information service is defined as “the offering of a capability for generating, acquiring, 
storing, transforming, processing, retrieving, utilizing, or making available information via 
telecommunications, and includes electronic publishing, but does not include any use of any such 
capability for the management, control, or operation of a telecommunications system or the 
management of a telecommunications service.” 47 U.S.C. § 153(20) (2010).   16 
 
with sole reliance on one origination and termination carrier for most individual subscribers, 
accrues ample market power for ISPs that possess both the incentive and ability to abuse this 
power, particularly when vertically integrated ISPs offer content and applications that compete 
with what unaffiliated ventures have available. 
  The FCC has no basis to depart from its longstanding policy that recognizes the 
competitive and operational distinctions between facilities-based providers and those services that 
depend on networks to reach end-users.  Consistent with its statutory mandates, the Commission 
could apply regulatory oversight where facilities-based, first and last-mile providers have the 
incentive and power to use their control in network infrastructure in ways that could interfere with 
competition and innovation in services that depend on this infrastructure.  Content and applications, 
riding on top of network links, qualify for non-regulation in light of the fact that these layers 
operate competitively and must rely on the telecommunications services 
38
In the absence of a new statutory mandate to impose network neutrality rules, the FCC 
must find a jurisdictional basis in existing law.  The Commission primarily has applied its ancillary 
jurisdiction based on Title I of the Communications Act, coupled with the view that other portions 
of the Communications Act provide the statutory basis for affirmative efforts to promote access to 
 of carriers possibly 
subject to regulatory oversight.  Ventures offering content and applications operate in a robustly 
competitive marketplace, limited only by the network bottleneck through which all content and 
applications must traverse.  Applying network neutrality principles to the vibrant application and 
content markets would endanger the open Internet because of the real potential for such regulations 
to stifle innovation, create disincentives for investment and impose unnecessary operating costs. 
                                                 
38  Telecommunications service is defined as “the offering of telecommunications for a fee 
directly to the public, or to such classes of users as to be effectively available directly to the public, 
regardless of the facilities used.” 47 U.S.C. § 153(46) (2010). 
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the Internet.  In light of the Comcast decision, a reasonable reading of these statutory references 
would limit their applicability to ventures that operate wire or radio conduits as 
telecommunications service providers and not to information service providers, or suppliers of 
Internet-mediated content, software and services.  Nothing in the statutory provisions cited by the 
FCC to justify its regulatory intervention to promote an “open” Internet  provides any basis for the 
Commission to extend its regulatory reach to ventures supplying the content delivered by 
unaffiliated ISPs. 
Lower down in the layers that combine to create Internet services, the FCC might reclassify 
Internet access as a telecommunications service, subject to portions of the available regulations 
contained in Title II of the Communications Act.  Such a reclassification surely will trigger an 
onslaught of lobbying and litigation, 
39 but it need not impose burdensome government oversight.  
The FCC has a congressionally authorized procedure for streamlining common carrier oversight in 
light of precompetitive marketplace conditions that support the use of “light-handed” regulation. 
40
A.  The Commission’s Statutory Basis for Applying Network Neutrality Rules 
(including Title I, Secs. 201(b), 230(b) and 706(a)) Extend Only to Ventures 
that Provide Internet Access via Wire or Radio. 
 
 
                                                 
39  See, e.g., Edward Wyatt, F.C.C. Proposes Rules on Internet Access, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 
2010, at B3, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/07/technology/07broadband.html. 
 
40  47 U.S.C. § 160(a) (2009) establishes regulatory forbearance criteria for 
telecommunications service providers.  The FCC can abandon most Title II common carrier 
regulatory requirements if it determines that: (1) enforcement of such regulation or provision is not 
necessary to ensure that the charges, practices, classifications, or regulations by, for, or in 
connection with that telecommunications carrier or telecommunications service are just and 
reasonable and are not unjustly or unreasonably discriminatory; (2) enforcement of such regulation 
or provision is not necessary for the protection of consumers; and (3) forbearance from applying 
such provision or regulation is consistent with the public interest. 
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  The FCC recognizes that facilities-based ISPs, operating between end users downstream 
and content providers upstream, have the incentive and ability to engage in practices 
41
In many parts of the United States, customers have limited options for high-
speed broadband Internet access service.  Moreover, broadband providers 
generally sell other services—such as voice and video—that face 
competition from content and applications offered by others over the 
Internet.  As a result, broadband providers’ interests in maximizing profits 
may not always align with the interests of end users and the public. 
 that can 
frustrate the Internet access goals of both subscribers and content providers, as well as broader 




Broadband Internet access service providers possessing market power may 
have an incentive to raise prices charged to content, application, and service 
providers and end users.  Not only would that harm users overall, but it 
could reduce innovation at the edge of the network and cause some end 




While acknowledging that it “has traditionally focused on providers of broadband Internet access 
service,” 
44
                                                 
41   “[E]ven if there is competition among broadband Internet access service providers, once 
an end-user customer has chosen to subscribe to a particular broadband Internet access service 
provider, this may give that broadband Internet access service provider the ability, at least in theory, 
to favor or disfavor any traffic destined for that subscriber.”  Open Internet NPRM, 24 F.C.C.R. at 
13094. 
 the FCC nevertheless invited comments on the merits of “phrasing one or more of the 
   
42  Id. at 13067.  The Commission also noted: “The evolution in Internet usage, and associated 
developments in network technology, have respectively motivated and enabled network operators 
to differentiate price and service for end users and for providers of content, applications, and 
services.  A significant debate has developed over how best to preserve the Internet’s openness.  
We thus find it appropriate at this time to evaluate the need for oversight of broadband Internet 
access service providers’ practices.” Id. at 13084.   
 
43  Id. at 13093.   
 
44  Id. at 13103 (citing Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet Over 
Wireline Facilities, 20 F.C.C.R. 14986, 14988 (2005); Appropriate Framework for Broadband 
Access to the Internet over Wireline Facilities; Universal Service Obligations of Broadband 
Providers; Review of Regulatory Requirements for Incumbent LEC Broadband 
Telecommunications Services; Computer III Further Remand Proceedings: Bell Operating 19 
 
Internet openness principles as obligations of other entities, in addition to providers of broadband 
Internet access service.” 
45
  Simply put, the FCC lacks any jurisdictional basis or compelling public interest need to 
impose Internet openness principles or network neutrality rules on providers of content.  Even 
regulation of lower-layer functions will require the Commission to explain how Internet access has 
become the functional equivalent to essential public utility-type telecommunications service and 
not optional and presumably competitive information services.  None of the statutory clauses cited 
by the Commission to support its assertion of jurisdiction over ISPs can stretch further to include 
content providers.  The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals did not consider them the basis for even 
lower layer regulation.  
   
46
                                                                                                                                                             
Company Provision of Enhanced Services; 1998 Biennial Regulatory Review—Review of 
Computer III and ONA Safeguards and Requirements; Conditional Petition of the Verizon 
Telephone Companies for Forbearance Under 47 U.S.C. § 160(c) with Regard to Broadband 
Services Provided Via Fiber to the Premises; Petition of the Verizon Telephone Companies for 
Declaratory Ruling or, Alternatively, for Interim Waiver with Regard to Broadband Services 
Provided Via Fiber to the Premises; Consumer Protection in the Broadband Era, CC Docket Nos. 
02-33, 95-20, 98-10, 01-337, WC Docket Nos. 04-242, 05-271, Report and Order and Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking, 20 F.C.C.R. 14853, 14904 (2005), aff’d, Time Warner Telecom, Inc. v. 
FCC., 507 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2007).   
  The FCC does not have open-ended jurisdiction to regulate content, nor 
 
45  Open Internet NPRM, 24 F.C.C.R. at 13104.  The FCC appears to make this request at the 
recommendation of a single ISP even though the Commission acknowledges that the 2005 Internet 
Policy Statement, which contains principles the Commission now wants to establish as rules, “was 
placed in five already-opened dockets dealing with issues relating to Internet access service 
providers, but it was not placed in the docket most likely to address content, applications, and 
services—the IP-Enabled Services [19 F.C.C.R. 4863 (2004)] docket.”  Id. at n.223. 
 
46   “We have ancillary jurisdiction over matters not directly addressed in the Act when the 
subject matter falls within the agency’s general statutory grant of jurisdiction and the regulation is 
‘reasonably ancillary to the effective performance of the Commission’s various responsibilities.’   
That test is met with respect to broadband Internet access service.” Open Internet NPRM, 24 
F.C.C.R. at 13099 (quoting United States v. Sw. Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 172–73 (1968) (citing 
United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649, 662 (1972)).  See also Formal Complaint of 
Free Press and Public Knowledge Against Comcast Corporation for Secretly Degrading Peer-to-20 
 
does a claim to regulate aspects of Internet-mediated communications and information services 
automatically extend to content carried via Internet conduits.    
Similarly, the FCC cannot credibly read the language in Sections 230(b) and 201(b) of 
Communications Act, as amended, and Section 706(a)  
47 of the Telecommunications Act of     
1996 
48  as extending the Commission’s regulatory wingspan over any Internet-mediated content.   
Section 230(b)(1) states that it “is the policy of the United States . . . to promote the continued 
development of the Internet and other interactive computer services and other interactive 
media . . . .” 
49   Section 230(b)(2) states that it “is the policy of the United States . . . to preserve 
the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet and other interactive 
computer services, ” 
50
Internet.  
 which is hardly an explicit or implicit endorsement of FCC regulation that 
could impact adversely the currently vibrant and free marketplace of ideas available via the             
51
                                                                                                                                                             
Peer Applications, 23 F.C.C.R. 13028, 13033-44 (2008).  But cf. Comcast Corp., supra n. 3. 
(rejecting the FCC’s extension of ancillary jurisdiction absent a direct statutory link). 
  Section 201(b) of the Communications Act authorizes the FCC to “prescribe such 
rules and regulations as may be necessary in the public interest to carry out the provisions of this  
 
47   Codified at 47 U.S.C. § 1302(a). 
 
48   Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996). 
 
49    47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(1).   
 
50   47 U.S.C. §230(b)(2). 
 
51  “The dramatic expansion of this new marketplace of ideas . . . demonstrates that the growth 
of the Internet has been and continues to be phenomenal.  As a matter of constitutional tradition, in 
the absence of evidence to the contrary, we presume that governmental regulation of the content of 
speech is more likely to interfere with the free exchange of ideas than to encourage it.  The interest 
in encouraging freedom of expression in a democratic society outweighs any theoretical but 





  Section 706(a) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 directs the FCC and state public 
utility commissions to “encourage the deployment on a reasonable and timely basis of advanced 
telecommunications capability to all Americans (including, in particular, elementary and secondary 
schools and classrooms) by utilizing, in a manner consistent with the public interest, convenience 
and necessity, price cap regulation, regulatory forbearance, measures that promote competition in 
the local telecommunications market, or other regulating methods that remove barriers to 
infrastructure investment.”  
  The FCC cannot lawfully bootstrap a statutory grant of authority to establish rules for 
any substantive area outside the Commission’s jurisdiction. 
53 Congress defined advanced telecommunications capability “without 
regard to any transmission media or technology, as high-speed, switched, broadband 
telecommunications capability that enables users to originate and receive high-quality voice, data, 
graphics and video telecommunications using any technology.”  
54
                                                 
52   47 U.S.C. § 201(b).  See also Alliance for Community Media v. FCC, 529 F.3d 763, 772–
74 (6th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2821 (2009); AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Bd., 525 
U.S. 366 (1999). 
 The statute clearly focuses on 
promoting access to the Internet, i.e., the wire and radio facilities used by ISPs to provide first and 
last mile Internet access to end users and to provide these users with the upstream links into the 
Internet cloud for accessing content, applications and services.   Any statutory mandate that the 
FCC may construe as authorizing it  to regulate the Internet has explicit limits designed to narrow 
FCC oversight to enhancing public access to Internet conduits, whether classified as 
telecommunications services or information services.  
 
53   47 U.S.C. § 1302(a). 
 
54   47 U.S.C. § 1302(d)(1). 
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B.  The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Rejected the FCC’s Ancillary Jurisdiction 
  Rationale. 
 
  In rejecting the FCC’s attempt to sanction Comcast for interfering with subscribers’ peer-
to-peer traffic absent legitimate network management requirements, the D.C. Circuit Court of 
Appeals severely sidetracked the Commission’s attempt to establish binding network neutrality 
policies, rules and regulations absent an explicit legislative mandate.   Noting that the Commission 
invoked no express statutory authority, the court considered whether “barring Comcast from 
interfering with its customers’ use of peer-to-peer networking applications is ‘reasonably ancillary 
to the . . . effective performance of its statutorily mandated responsibilities.’” 
55  Notwithstanding 
the Supreme Court’s broad deference to the FCC’s assertion of ancillary jurisdiction in the Brand 
X case, 
56 where the Court affirmed the FCC’s determination that cable modem-provided Internet 
access constitutes a lightly regulated information service, the D.C. Circuit required evidence that 
the FCC’s regulatory action had a direct link to its statutorily mandated responsibilities. 
57
                                                 




56   The court does not interpret the Brand X case as precedent for the imposition of plenary 
authority over any matter involving cable television company provided Internet access. “By 
leaping from Brand X’s observation that the Commission’s ancillary authority may allow it to 
impose some kinds of obligations on cable Internet providers to a claim of plenary authority over 
such providers, the Commission runs afoul of Southwestern Cable and Midwest Video I.”  Comcast 
Corp., 600 F. 3d at 650.  “The Commission’s exercise of ancillary authority over Comcast’s 
network management practices must, to repeat, ‘be independently justified.’” Id. at 651 (citing 
Nat’l Ass’n of Regulatory Util. Comm’rs v. FCC, 533 F.2d 601, 612 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (rejecting 
the FCC’s preemption of state and local regulation of two-way, intrastate, non-video cable 
transmissions)). 
 
57  The Commission therefore rests its assertion of authority over Comcast’s network 
management practices on the broad language of section 4(i) of the Act: “The Commission may 
perform any and all acts, make such rules and regulations, and issue such orders, not inconsistent 
with this chapter, as may be necessary in the execution of its functions . . . .” Comcast Corp., 600 F. 
3d at 644 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 154(i); Formal Complaint of Free Press & Public Knowledge Against 23 
 
court vacated the FCC’s sanctioning order of Comcast based on the view that the FCC could only 
refer to congressional statements of policy which do not provide a precedent for creating such 
responsibilities and to various sections of the Communications Act that the court deemed 
inapplicable for substantive and procedural reasons. 
  The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the Commission’s reprimand of Comcast based 
on the court’s refusal to accept the Commission’s claim of ancillary jurisdiction.  The court 
referred to the three major cable television cases 
58 where the Supreme Court had affirmed the 
FCC’s ancillary jurisdictional claim “at a time when, as with the Internet today, the 
Communications Act gave the Commission no express authority to regulate such systems.”
59  As it 
had done in the case rejecting the FCC’s attempt to require television set manufacturers to build 
units capable of processing digital rights management, “broadcast flags,” 
60
                                                                                                                                                             
Comcast Corporation for Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications, 23 F.C.C.R. 13028, 13036 
(2008)). 
 the court distilled the 
precedent for ancillary jurisdiction established by these cases into a two part test whether: “(1) the 
Commission’s general jurisdictional grant under Title I [of the Communications Act] covers the 
regulated subject and (2) the regulations are reasonably ancillary to the Commission’s effective 
 
58    See FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689 (1979) (Midwest Video II); United States 
v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649 (1972) (Midwest Video I); United States v. Sw. Cable Co., 
392 U.S. 157 (1968).  
 
59   Comcast Corp., 600 F.3d at 646. 
 
60  Broadcast flags are instructions transmitted from content sources that limit or prohibit 
redistribution by receiving devices.  “One of the leading proposals for a . . . [digital television] 
broadcast content protection mechanism involves the use of a redistribution control descriptor or 
flag to signal DTV reception equipment to limit the indiscriminate redistribution of digital 
broadcast content.” Digital Broadcast Content Protection, MB Docket 02-230, Report and Order 
and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 18 F.C.C.R. 23550, 23556 (2003), vacated in part 




performance of its statutorily mandated responsibilities . . ..” 
61  The court determined that the FCC 
had not satisfied the second part of the test.
62
  The court flatly rejected the FCC’s attempt to infer congressional intent for the 
Commission to extend its regulatory wingspan to include Internet access.  In a series of references 
to provisions of the Communications Act,
 
63
Instead, the Commission maintains that congressional policy by itself 
creates ‘statutorily mandated responsibilities’ sufficient to support the 
exercise of section 4(i) ancillary authority. Not only is this argument flatly 
inconsistent with Southwestern Cable, Midwest Video I, Midwest Video II, 
and NARUC II, but if accepted it would virtually free the Commission from 
its congressional tether.
 the Commission expansively read congressional policy 




                                                 
61    Comcast Corp., 600 F.3d at 646.  
 
62    The court noted that Comcast had conceded “that the Commission’s action here satisfies 
the first requirement because the company’s Internet service qualifies as ‘interstate and foreign 
communication by wire’ within the meaning of Title I of the Communications Act.” Id. 600 F.3d at 
646 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 152(a)).  The court also rejected the Commission’s claim that because 
Comcast had used the existence of FCC jurisdiction in another case the company should be 
judicially stopped from challenging the Commission’s jurisdiction now.  The court interpreted 
Comcast’s position in the other case as simply acknowledging the FCC’s jurisdiction over wire and 
radio services, which includes what Comcast offers.  “Because Comcast never clearly argued in the 
California litigation that the Commission’s assertion of authority over the company’s network 
management practices would be ‘reasonably ancillary to the Commission’s effective performance 
of its statutorily mandated responsibilities’ . . . , that question remains for us to answer.” Id. 600 
F.3d at 649. 
   
63    The Commission cited to §§ 1, 230(b), 706, 257, 201 and 623 of the Communications Act.  
 
64    Comcast Corp. 600 F.3d at 655. 
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The court concluded that the FCC could attempt unlawfully to invoke ancillary jurisdiction to 
apply any number of regulatory requirements to cable modem provided Internet access without 
explicit congressional authority to do so.
65
C.   Network Neutrality Rules Can Only Apply to Conduit Providers. 
 
   
  If the FCC extended binding regulatory obligations on content, application and service 
providers, the Commission surely  would have engaged in an unlawful mission creep, based on “an 
implausible reading of the statute, . . . [thereby] exceed[ing] the authority given it by Congress.” 
66  
Supreme Court Justice Scalia presciently warned that the FCC as an “experienced agency can 
(with some assistance from credulous courts) turn statutory constraints into bureaucratic 
discretions,” 
67
                                                 
65     “Were we to accept that theory of ancillary authority, we see no reason why the 
Commission would have to stop [at imposing regulation of Internet Service Providers’ rates], for 
we can think of few examples of regulations that apply to Title II common carrier services, Title III 
broadcast services, or Title VI cable services that the Commission, relying on the broad policies 
articulated in section 230(b) and section 1, would be unable to impose upon Internet service 
providers.” Comcast Corp., 600 F.3d at 655. 
 reserving, for example, the option of regulating Internet content based on statutes 
offering absolutely no basis for anything beyond promoting Internet access.  Nowhere in its 
previous involvement with the Internet, or in its regulatory classification of telecommunications 
services and information services, has the Commission ever sought to expand its regulatory 
mission and the scope of oversight to include content, software and services that traverse networks 
operated by ISPs.  Similarly, nothing in the objectives of network neutrality articulated by the FCC 
and others requires that the Commission make an unprecedented expansion of its jurisdiction 
 
66    Brand X, 545 U.S. at 1005 (2005) (Scalia, J. dissenting). 
   
67    Id. at 1013.  
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ostensibly to achieve the goals articulated by the Commission in its 2005 Internet Policy  
Statement  
68
II.  Ample Case Law Forecloses the FCC from Leveraging a Public Interest Argument to 
Regulate Content, Application and Software Providers. 
 and the Open Internet Order. 
 
  Providers of content, applications and services having no affiliation with downstream ISPs 
qualify for maximum protection from FCC regulation because these ventures do not operate wire 
or radio networks, and only use telecommunications bit transport services to deliver their content 
and services to end users.  The Commission has developed a long record of establishing a “bright 
line” regulatory demarcation between regulated carriers providing telecommunications services 
and more broadly wire or radio access on one hand, and unregulated ventures providing content, 
applications and software that ride on top of the transport services provided by facilities-based 
operators. 
  In its Second Computer Inquiry,
69 the FCC established a regulatory dichotomy between 
regulated basic telecommunications services and unregulated enhanced services based on the 
potential for facilities-based carriers to abuse their bottleneck control over access to enhanced 
facilities.  The Commission created structural safeguards that required separation between a 
facility-based carrier’s Title II regulated common carrier services and unregulated services 
provided by corporate affiliates.
70
                                                 
68  Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet Over Wireline Facilities, 
Policy Statement, 20 F.C.C.R. 14986 (2005) [hereinafter 2005 Internet Policy Statement]. 
  The Commission subsequently concluded in the Third 
 
69    Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commission’s Rules and Regulations (Second 
Computer Inquiry), Final Decision, 77 F.C.C.2d 384 (1980), aff’d sub nom. Computer and 
Communications Indus. Ass’n. v. FCC, 693 F.2d 198 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
 
70    “In the Computer II rules, the Commission  subjected facilities-based providers to 
common-carrier duties not because of the nature of the ‘offering’ made by those carriers, but rather 




With enactment of the Telecommunications Act of 1996,
 that a single firm could achieve operational efficiencies without 
anticompetitive harm by jointly providing basic and enhanced services.  However, this relaxation 
of structural and functional separation requirements did not eliminate the dichotomy between 
regulated telecommunications services provided by network carriers and unregulated services.   
72 Congress mandated 
continuation of this regulatory dichotomy.  The FCC must continue to apply Title II common 
carriage requirements on telecommunications service providers,
73 subject to some regulatory 
forbearance opportunities where the public interest supports partial deregulation.
74  The 
Commission has limited regulatory oversight responsibilities for information service providers, the 
replacement classification for enhanced services.
75
                                                                                                                                                             
possessed by virtue of the ‘bottleneck’ local telephone facilities they owned.” Brand X, 545 U.S. at 
996. 
  Neither the Telecommunications Act of 1996 
 
71    Amendment of Sections 64.702 of the Commission’s Rules & Regulations (Third 
Computer Inquiry), Report and Order, 104 F.C.C.2d 958 (1986), vacated sub nom. California v. 
FCC, 905 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1990), on remand, Computer III Remand Proceedings: Bell 
Operating Co. Safeguards, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking & Order, 6 F.C.C.R. 174 (1990), rule 
modification, 6 F.C.C.R. 7571 (1991), vacated in part and remanded, California v. F.C.C., 39 F.3d 
919 (9th Cir. 1994), on remand, Computer III Further Remand Proceedings: Bell Operating Co. 
Provision of Enhanced Servs., Order, 10 F.C.C.R., 5692 (1995). 
 
72    Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 401, 110 Stat. 56, 128-29 
(codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (2008)). 
 
73    See, e.g., Reexamination of Roaming Obligations of Commercial Mobile Radio Service 
Providers, Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 22 F.C.C.R. 15817 
(2007) (clarifying that automatic roaming is a common carrier obligation for commercial mobile 
radio service carriers that requires them to provide roaming services to other carriers upon 
reasonable request and on a just, reasonable, and non-discriminatory basis pursuant to Sections 201 
and 202 of the Communications Act). 
 
74  47 U.S.C. § 160 (2010).   
 
75     “Under its Computer Inquiry rules, which foreshadowed the definitions of ‘information’ 
and ‘telecommunications’ services, . . . the Commission forbore from regulating as common 28 
 
nor any other law provides the FCC with statutory authority to regulate the content, applications 
and software that traverse the networks operated by carriers subject to the Commission’s 
jurisdiction. 
  The holding in American Library Ass’n v. FCC 
76
Characterizing the FCC’s action as the most sweeping assertion of authority in the 
Commission’s seven decades of existence, the court rejected the use of ancillary jurisdiction under 
Title I in lieu of explicit congressional authorization: 
 provides solid precedent for the premise 
that the FCC cannot leverage its ample statutory authority over facilities-based network operators 
to extend its regulatory wingspan to include content and applications that these carriers deliver.  
The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals held that the FCC ignored consumers’ rights to be free of 
government intrusion when the Commission sought to extend its regulatory wingspan to include 
electronic devices on consumer premises that receive content and may be remotely programmed by 
carriers to process Digital Rights Management instructions (broadcast flags) that would limit the 
copying, reformatting and redistribution options available to consumers.   
The Commission recognized that it may exercise ancillary jurisdiction only when 
two conditions are satisfied: (1) the Commission’s general jurisdictional grant 
under Title I covers the regulated subject and (2) the regulations are reasonably 
ancillary to the Commission’s effective performance of its statutorily mandated 
responsibilities.  The Commission’s general jurisdictional grant under Title I 
plainly encompasses the regulation of apparatus that can receive television 
                                                                                                                                                             
carriers ‘value-added networks’--non-facilities-based providers who leased basic services from 
common carriers and bundled them with enhanced services; it said that they, unlike facilities-based 
providers, would be deemed to provide only enhanced services.” Brand X, 545 U.S. at 1011. 
 
76    406 F.3d 689 (D.C. Cir. 2005)[hereinafter ALA v. FCC]. “In this case, all relevant 
materials concerning the FCC’s jurisdiction - including the words of the Communications Act of 
1934, its legislative history, subsequent legislation, relevant case law, and Commission practice - 
confirm that the FCC has no authority to regulate consumer electronic devices that can be used for 
receipt of wire or radio communication when those devices are not engaged in the process of radio 
or wire transmission.” Id. at 798. 
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broadcast content, but only while those apparatus are engaged in the process of 
receiving a television broadcast.  Title I does not authorize the Commission to 
regulate receiver apparatus after a transmission is complete.  As a result, the FCC’s 
purported exercise of ancillary authority founders on the first condition.  There is 
no statutory foundation for the broadcast flag rules, and consequently the rules are 
ancillary to nothing.  Therefore, we hold that the Commission acted outside the 





  The court determined that broadcast flags operate as a curb on the ability of digital 
television reception equipment to redistribute digital broadcast content after having received the 
content and not during the actual broadcast transmission.
78  Finding no congressional authority for 
the FCC to regulate consumers’ use of already received broadcast content, the court refused to 
defer to agency expertise.
79
  The court also rejected the Commission’s ancillary jurisdiction rationale based on the 
Communications Act.  With references to several communications cases having a judicial 
  The court reasoned that absent the need for explicit congressional 
authority the FCC would have plenary authority to regulate any consumer electronics and 
computer devices.   
                                                 
77    Id. at 691-692. 
 
78     “The effectiveness of the broadcast flag regime is dependent on programming being 
flagged and on devices capable of receiving broadcast DTV signals (collectively "demodulator 
products") being able to recognize and give effect to the flag. Under the rule, new demodulator 
products (e.g., televisions, computers, etc.) must include flag-recognition technology.  This 
technology, in combination with broadcasters’ use of the flag, would prevent redistribution of 
broadcast programming.”Id. at 693. 
 
79    See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, (1984). 
The Supreme Court supported deferral to the expertise of a regulating agency “if the intent of 
Congress is clear.” 467 U.S. at 842-43.  If “Congress has not directly addressed the precise 
question at issue,” and the agency has acted pursuant to an express or implied delegation of 
authority, the agency’s statutory interpretation is entitled to deference, as long as it is reasonable.  
Id. at 843-44.  See also United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001). 
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endorsement of ancillary jurisdiction, the court noted that all prior cases with precedential value 
involved entities engaged in “communication by wire or radio”: 
The Court’s decisions in Southwestern Cable, Midwest Video I, and Midwest Video 
II were principally focused on the second prong of the ancillary jurisdiction test.  
This is unsurprising, because the subject matter of the regulations at issue in those 
cases--cable television--constituted interstate communication by wire or radio, and 
thus fell within the scope of the Commission’s general jurisdictional grant under 
Title I of the Communications Act.  However, these cases leave no doubt that the 
Commission may not invoke its ancillary jurisdiction under Title I to regulate 




The court also rejected the FCC’s rationale that broadcast flag processing regulations could 
lawfully fit within the Commission’s congressionally authorized responsibility for promulgating 
technical requirements for television receiving equipment as part of its implementation of rules 
relating to the transition from analog to digital television.
81
III.  The FCC Has Never Stated It Has Statutory Authority to Regulate Internet-mediated 
Content and Services, Except for Instances Where the Carrier Offers a Related 
Telecommunications Service or in Special Circumstances Provides 
Telecommunications to End Users.  
 
 
  Nothing in the FCC’s growing involvement with matters pertaining to the Internet 
evidences an intention on the Commission’s part to extend its regulatory wingspan to include 
Internet-mediated content and services.  The Communications Act of 1934, as amended, expressly 
limits the FCC’s substantive jurisdiction to wire and radio services, such as broadcasting, 
telecommunications and cable television services.  Mindful that the information services 
                                                 
80    ALA v. FCC, 406 F.3d at 702. 
 
81     “It is enough here for us to find that the Communications Act of 1934 does not indicate a 
legislative intent to delegate authority to the Commission to regulate consumer electronic devices 
that can be used for receipt of wire or radio communication when those devices are not engaged in 
the process of radio or wire transmission.  That is the end of the matter.  It turns out, however, that 
subsequent legislation enacted by Congress confirms the limited scope of the agency’s ancillary 
jurisdiction and makes it clear that the broadcast flag regulations exceed the agency's delegated 
authority under the statute.”  Id. at 706. 
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classification significantly constrains what it can do to serve the public interest and aware of the 
artificial competitive advantages that accrue from incorrect regulatory classification, the FCC has 
appreciated the need, on occasion, to clarify what regulatory obligations apply to particular types 
of operators. 
For example, the FCC determined that wireless telecommunications service providers 
needed to be reminded of their still applicable Title II common carrier obligations, including the 
duty to provide “roaming” subscribers with access to their networks, on cost-based and 
nondiscriminatory terms.
82  Similarly, the Commission determined that routing 
telecommunications services via the Internet does not automatically convert these services into 
information services.
83  Additionally, the Commission has asserted ancillary jurisdiction and has 
applied selective regulatory requirements on Voice over the Internet Protocol (“VoIP”) service 
providers, primarily limited to VoIP operators that provide service to and from the conventional, 
dial up, public switched telephone network (“PSTN”). 
84
                                                 
82  Reexamination of Roaming Obligations of Commercial Mobile Radio Service Providers, 
Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 22 F.C.C.R. 15817 (2007). 
 Selective FCC regulation of information 
 
83    See e.g., Regulation of Prepaid Calling Card Services, Declaratory Ruling and Report and 
Order, 21 F.C.C.R. 7290, (2006), rev’d in part, Qwest Services Corp. v. FCC, 509 F.3d 531, (D.C. 
Cir. 2007) (affirming the FCC’s regulatory determination but reversing the Commission’s different 
treatment of calling cards that provide access to VoIP versus ones that provide a menu of services 
and options). 
 
84   VoIP service providers that can receive or deliver calls to conventional wired and wireless 
networks must contribute to universal service funding programs designed to promote affordable 
dial up telephone service. Universal Serv. Contribution Methodology, Report and Order and Notice 
of Proposed Rulemaking, 21 F.C.C.R. 7518, 7538 (2006) (extending section 254(d) permissive 
authority to require interconnected VoIP providers to contribute to the USF), reh’g denied, vacated 
in part on other grounds, Vonage Holding Corp. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 1232 (D.C. Cir. 2007).  
Additionally they must make arrangements to support subscriber access to emergency 911 service, 
cooperate with law enforcement authorities, incorporate the technical accommodations telephone 
companies provide persons with disabilities, such as deaf callers, and support the ability of existing 
subscribers to keep their existing telephone numbers when switching service.  IP-Enabled Servs., 32 
 
services and VoIP offer no foundation for supporting an expansion of FCC oversight to any other 
type of Internet-mediated content, application, or service. 
IV.  The FCC’s Network Neutrality Concerns Address Instances Where Conduit 
Providers Unnecessarily Impede End User Internet Access to Content, Applications 
and Software.  
 
The FCC has never stated that the goals of preserving an open Internet and safeguarding 
consumers require the Commission to extend legacy regulation onto content, applications and 
software.  Simply put, the factors supporting the creation of enforceable openness rules to ISPs do 
not exist for extending any such rules to Internet-mediated content and applications.  ISPs operate a 
bottleneck in their capacity as intermediaries between end users downstream and content and 
applications providers upstream.  The Commission must safeguard end user access to the Internet 
in light of the ability of ISPs to exploit their bottlenecks in ways that disserve the public interest 
through anticompetitive conduct, but also through unnecessarily restrictive, discriminatory and 
                                                                                                                                                             
E911 Requirements for IP-Enabled Service Providers, First Report and Order and Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking, 20 F.C.C.R. 10245 (2005), petition for review denied, 473 F.3d 302 (D.C. 
Cir. 2006); Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act & Broadband Access & Servs., 
First Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 20 F.C.C.R. 14989 (2005), 
petition for review denied, 451 F.3d 226 (D.C. Cir. 2006); IP-Enabled Servs., Implementation of 
Sections 255 and 251(A)(2) of the Communications Act of 1934, as Enacted by the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996: Access to Telecommunications Service, Telecommunications 
Equipment and Customer Premises Equipment by Persons with Disabilities Telecommunications, 
Report and Order, 22 F.C.C.R. 11275 (2007), Order and Public Notice Seeking Comment, 22 
F.C.C.R. 18319 (2007) (granting in part and denying in part waivers of the FCC order). See also, 
Contributions to the Telecommunications Relay Services Fund, CG Docket No. 11-47, Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking, FCC 11-38, 2011 WL 742268 (rel. March 3, 2011); Telephone Number 
Requirements for IP Enabled Services Providers; Local Number Portability Porting Interval and 
Validation Requirements; IP-Enabled Services; Telephone Number Portability; CTIA Petitions for 
Declaratory Ruling on Wireline-Wireless Porting Issues; Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis; 
Number Resource Optimization, WC Docket Nos. 07-243, 07-244, 04-36; CC Docket Nos. 95-116, 
99-200, Report and Order, Declaratory Ruling, Order on Remand, and Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking, 22 F.C.C.R. 19531 (2007); Matters of Local Number Portability Porting Interval and 
Validation, WC Docket No. 07-244, Report and Order, 25 F.C.C.R. 6953 (May 20, 




intrusive service terms and conditions that are unnecessary to achieve legitimate network 
management objectives. 
Absent vastly changed circumstances and compelling reasons, the Commission has 
expressly stated the intention to maintain “an established policy of minimal regulation of the 
Internet and the services provided over it.”
85
The extensive scholarly and advocacy literature on network neutrality has concentrated on 
the ISPs and their relationship downstream with end users and upstream with content, applications 
and service providers.
  In the context of promoting network neutrality, the 
Commission’s concern about content derives not from an interest in regulating it to remedy some 
apparent market failure, but to ensure that end users can freely access Internet-mediated content 
and that content creators operate on a level competitive playing field when vying for consumers. 
86
                                                 
85  IP-Enabled Services, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 19 F.C.C.R. at 4865. 
  Authors debate whether these carriers have the incentive and ability to 
 
86  See Marvin Ammori, Beyond Content Neutrality: Understanding Content-Based 
Promotion of Democratic Speech, 61 FED. COMM. L.J. 273 (March 2009); Dan G. Barry, The 
Effect of Video Franchising Reform on Net Neutrality: Does the Beginning of IP Convergence 
Mean That It Is Time for Net Neutrality Regulation, 24 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. 
L.J. 421 (Jan. 2008); Sascha D. Meinrath & Victor W. Pickard, Transcending Net Neutrality: Ten 
Steps Toward an Open Internet, 12  J. INTERNET L., No. 6, 1 (Dec. 2008); Jennifer L. Newman, 
Keeping the Internet Neutral: Net Neutrality and Its Role in Protecting Political Expression on the 
Internet, 31 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 153 (Fall 2008); T. Randolph Beard, Network Neutrality 
and Industry Structure, 29 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT L.J. 149 (Winter 2007); Jerry Brito, A Tale of 
Two Commissions: Net Neutrality and Regulatory Analysis, 16 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 1 (2007); 
Brett Frischmann & Barbara van Schewick, Yoo’s Frame and What It Ignores: Network Neutrality 
and the Economics of an Information Superhighway, 47 JURIMETRICS J. 383 (2007); Tim Wu and 
Christopher S. Yoo, Keeping the Internet Neutral? Tim Wu and Christopher Yoo Debate, 59 FED. 
COMM. L.J. 575 (June 2007); Robert E. Litan, Unintended Consequences of Net Neutrality 
Regulation, 5 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 533 (Spring 2007); Randolph J. May, Net Neutrality 
Mandates: Neutering the First Amendment in the Digital Age, I/S: J. L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 
197 (Spring, 2007); Amit M. Schejter, “Justice, and Only Justice, You Shall Pursue”: Network 
Neutrality, the First Amendment and John Rawls’s Theory of Justice, 14 MICH. TELECOMM. & 
TECH. L. REV. 137 (Fall 2007); Howard A. Shelanski, Network Neutrality: Regulating with More 
Questions Than Answers, 6 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 23 (Fall 2007); Barbara A. Cherry, 
Misusing Network Neutrality to Eliminate Common Carriage Threatens Free Speech and the 34 
 
discriminate, what they can do under the rubric of network management and whether consumers 
and content/applications providers need FCC safeguards to guard against anticompetitive conduct 
and other harmful practices.  The matter of ISPs’ relationship with upstream ventures raises 
questions whether the FCC needs to establish rules that prevent prioritization and other preferential 
treatment of specific content, e.g., supplied by affiliates, and not whether the Internet has sufficient 





                                                                                                                                                             
Postal System, 33 N. KY. L. REV. 483 (2006); Christopher S. Yoo, Network Neutrality and the 
Economics of Congestion, 94 GEO. L.J. 1847 (June 2006); Bill D. Herman, Opening Bottlenecks: 
On Behalf of Mandated Network Neutrality, 59 FED. COMM. L.J. 103 (Dec. 2006); William G. 
Laxton, Jr., The End of Net Neutrality, 2006 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 15 (July 18, 2006); Lawrence 
Lessig, In Support of Network Neutrality, I/S: J. L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 185 (Spring 2007); J. 
Gregory Sidak, A Consumer-Welfare Approach to Network Neutrality Regulation of the Internet, 2 
J. COMP. L. & ECON., No. 3, 349 (2006); Adam Thierer, Are  “Dumb Pipe” Mandates Smart 
Public Policy? Vertical Integration, Net Neutrality, and the Network Layers Model, 3 J. 
TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 275 (2005); Tim Wu, Network Neutrality, Broadband 
Discrimination, 2 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH L. 141 (2005), Christopher S. Yoo, Beyond 
Network Neutrality, 19 HARVARD J. L. & TECH. (Fall 2005); Christopher S. Yoo, Would Mandating 
Broadband Network Neutrality Help or Hurt Competition? A Comment on the End-to-End Debate, 
3 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 23 (2004); Mark A. Lemley & Lawrence Lessig, The End of 
End-to-End: Preserving the Architecture of the Internet in the Broadband Era, 48 UCLA L. REV. 
925 (2001). 
 
87   “In the absence of network neutrality regulation, there is a real threat that network 
providers will discriminate against independent producers of applications, content or portals or 
exclude them from their network.”  Barbara van Schewick, Towards an Economic Framework for 
Network Neutrality Regulation, 5 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 329, 390 (2007).  “Like cable 
television operators, the telephone company and cable modem duopolists in the broadband 
marketplace in almost all cases provide the sole interactive ‘data pipe’ into subscribers’ homes.  
They thus have the incentive, given their integration with broadband content providers, to act as 
‘gatekeepers’ who can ‘flick the switch’ on competitors or any other online speakers whom they 
disfavor.”  Anthony E. Varona, Toward a Broadband Public Interest Standard, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 




A.  The 2005 Internet Policy Statement and the Open Internet Order Concentrate 
on Users’ Rights of Access Vis a Vis Conduit Providers. 
 
  Absent the two sentences contained in paragraph 101 of the Open Internet NPRM, the FCC 
consistently has considered Internet openness and the need for regulatory intervention to preserve 
it solely in terms of “users’ ability to access the Internet . . . [with no] intent[] to regulate the 
Internet itself or create a different Internet experience from the one that users have come to 
expect.” 
87  For each of the rules the FCC proposes to enforce, the Commission expressly limits the 
scope of enforcement to “a provider of broadband Internet access service.” 
88
B.  The Potential for Consumer Harm is Acute When ISPs Seek to Tilt the 
Competitive Playing Field by Favoring Affiliated Content Providers and 
Services. 
  The Commission 
properly limits its focus to the ventures able to affect consumer access to the Internet. 
 
  The marketplace for Internet-mediated content and services operates competitively, but 
runs the risk of becoming less so if ISPs can favor affiliated content providers.  When the FCC 
sanctioned Comcast for unnecessarily meddling with subscriber traffic, the Commission identified 
a situation where an ISP acted on its incentive and ability to tilt the competitively playing field to 
disadvantage a competitive alternative to the company’s video on demand services: 
Peer-to-peer applications, including those relying on BitTorrent, 
have become a competitive threat to cable operators such as 
Comcast because Internet users have the opportunity to view high-
quality video with BitTorrent that they might otherwise watch (and 
pay for) on cable television.  Such video distribution poses a 
particular competitive threat to Comcast’s video-on-demand 
(“VOD”) service. VOD . . . operates much like online video, where 
Internet users can select and download or stream any available 
                                                 
87   Open Internet NPRM, 24 F.C.C.R. at 13068. 
 
88    Id.  24 F.C.C.C.R. at 13128, Appendix A, Part 8, Sec. 8.5-8.23. 
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program without a schedule and watch it any time, generally with 




More generally, the Commission has acknowledged that: 
a broadband Internet access service provider that is also a pay 
television provider could charge providers or end users more to 
transmit or receive video programming over the Internet in order to 
protect the broadband Internet access service provider’s own pay 
television service.  Alternatively, such a broadband Internet access 
service provider could seek to protect its pay television service by 
degrading the performance of video programming delivered over the 
Internet by third parties. The result may be higher prices or worse 
service for some content and applications and inefficiently low 
investment in some content and application markets. 
90
   
 
C.  ISPs Can Combine Vertical Integration of Conduit and Content with the 
Power to Inspect, Drop, Prioritize and Otherwise Differentiate Bit Streams for 
Both Lawful Network Management Reasons and to Pursue Anticompetitive 
and Other Strategies that Harm Consumers. 
 
  Unlike content providers upstream, an ISP can operate as “a gatekeeper to the content, 
applications and services offered on the Internet.” 
91 The Commission acknowledges that ISPs 
“have an incentive to use this gatekeeper role to make it more difficult or expensive for end users 
to access services competing with those offered by the network operator or its affiliates.”  
92
                                                 
89    Formal Complaint of Free Press and Public Knowledge Against Comcast Corporation for 
Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications, 23 F.C.C.R. 13028, 13030 (2008) [hereinafter 
Comcast Investigation]. 
  This 
gatekeeper power provides ISPs with the capacity to constrain, prioritize, discriminate and 
otherwise shape traffic to achieve proper or improper objectives.  If the Commission does not rein 
 
90   Open Internet NPRM, 24 F.C.C.R. at 13094. 
 
91  Id. 
 
92    Id. 
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in such anticompetitive practices, recent decisions by the Supreme Court severely restrict the relief 
available through judicial appeals. 
93
The ISP gatekeeper function grows more powerful in light of the ability to use packet 
inspection techniques to “sniff” and identify types of traffic that the ISP wants to favor or handicap.  
“An ISP able to examine packets for purposes of assigning bitstreams into various tiers of service 
also provides an ISP with greater knowledge about the nature and type of the traffic it handles.  
Arguably, an ISP engaging in quality of service  . . . and price discrimination through deep packet 
inspection no longer operates as a neutral conduit lacking actual or constructive knowledge of what 
the packets represent.  ISPs that sniff packets actively examine the header of packets that provide 
traffic routing information, but also can identify characteristics of the content ‘payload’ contained 
in the packet.” 
 
94
ISPs have found it commercially advantageous to combine their conduit role with various 
activities relating to the creation, packaging  and offering of content via the Internet.  For example, 
cable television companies blend their Internet access conduit function as a provider of cable 
modem service, with various video program services that the companies own or have an affiliate 
relationship.  Similarly, wireless mobile telephone companies, provide both Internet access, but 
 
                                                 
93    The Supreme Court has concluded that because industry sector-specific legislation provides 
the FCC with authority to craft regulatory remedies, when the Commission refuses to act, appellate 
courts have no legal basis for imposing additional antitrust safeguards.  See Pac. Bell Tel. Co., v. 
Linkline Commc’ns., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1109 (2009) (holding that where the FCC has failed to 
investigate and remedy an instance where the wholesale price exceeds the retail price of service, 
courts have a severely limited basis to investigate further); Verizon Commc’ns., Inc. v. Law Office 
of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004) (holding that antitrust laws offer no additional 
safeguards when the FCC refuses to apply more aggressive safeguards available in the 
Communications Act, as amended).  
 
94    Rob Frieden, Internet Packet Sniffing and Its Impact on the Network Neutrality Debate and 
the Balance of Power Between Intellectual Property Creators and Consumers, 18 FORDHAM 
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J., 633, 644 (2008). 
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also showcase and provide easier access to a packaged collection of Internet-mediated content in 
what is commonly referred to as a “walled garden.” The Commission appreciates the potentially 
adverse impact on consumers and competition arising from such vertical integration. 
95
[W]e conclude that there are no good substitutes for some satellite-
delivered vertically integrated programming and that such 
programming therefore remains necessary for viable competition in 
the video distribution market.  Based on this finding, we conclude 
that vertically integrated programmers continue to have the ability to 
favor their affiliated cable operators over competitive MVPDs 
[multichannel video programming distributors] such that 
competition and diversity in the distribution of video programming 
would not be preserved and protected absent the rule.  . . . [W]e also 
find some trends that increase their incentive to withhold 
programming, such as the increase in horizontal consolidation of the 
cable industry, the increase in cable clustering, and the recent 
emergence of new competitors.  We also find specific factual 
evidence that, where the exclusive contract prohibition does not 
apply, such as in the case of terrestrially delivered programming, 
vertically integrated programmers have withheld and continue to 
withhold programming from competitive MVPDs. 
 For 
example, the Commission extensively regulates cable television ventures that combine content and 
conduit based on finding the potential for competitive and consumer harm: 
96
 
     
Because cable television companies generate much of the desired video content and control 
the major medium for distributing it, the FCC has expressed concern 
97
                                                 
95    See Open Internet NPRM, 24 F.C.C.R. at 13094 (“Where broadband Internet access service 
providers have market power and are vertically integrated or affiliated with content, application, or 
service providers, additional concerns may arise.”). 
 that the cable companies 
 
96    In the Matter of Implementation of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and 
Competition Act of 1992; Development of Competition and Diversity in Video Programming 
Distribution: Section 628(c)(5) of the Communications Act: Sunset of Exclusive Contract 
Prohibition; Review of the Commission’s Program Access Rules and Examination of 
Programming Tying Arrangements, 22 F.C.C.R. 17791, 17810 (2007). 
 
97    See Id. at 17816 (“Despite the increase in available programming over the past five years, 
we find that cable operators still own popular programming for which there are no close substitutes. 
The availability of new, non-integrated networks does not mitigate the adverse impact on 39 
 
can stifle competition, extract rates above competitive levels from subscribers, favor affiliated 
content providers and prevent the development of new content sources.  Note, however, that the 
Commission does not subject independent, stand-alone content providers to such regulations. 
D.  Discrimination at the Network Level Can Adversely Affect the Degree of 
Competition, Innovation and Investment in Applications and Services that 
Run “Over the Top.” 
 
Just as the FCC has acted to prevent vertically integrated cable television operators from 
thwarting video programming competition, the Commission should use its limited jurisdiction to 
establish rules that promote open access to content, applications and services that travel via (“over 
the top”) ISP network links.  ISPs can exploit some of the same gatekeeper roles as cable television 
operators by resorting to tactics, masquerading as legitimate network management, that block, 
delay, degrade and otherwise interfere with end user access to content.  
Unlike the European Union, 
98
                                                                                                                                                             
competition of a competitive MVPD's inability to access popular vertically integrated 
programming. The record reflects that numerous national programming networks, RSNs, premium 
programming networks, and VOD networks are cable-affiliated programming networks that are 
demanded by MVPD subscribers and for which there are no adequate substitutes.”). 
 the FCC has not adopted a layered model to identify what 
Internet functions constitute regulated and unregulated services.  However, both the 
Communications Act and the Commission’s regulations calibrate the scope of government 
oversight in a manner that parallels the OSI model with extensive regulation primarily applied to 
 
98  See John T. Nakahata, Regulating Information Platforms: The Challenge of Rewriting 
Communications Regulation from the Bottom Up, 1 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 95 (2002); 
Douglas C. Sicker & Joshua L. Mindel, Refinements of a Layered Model for Telecommunications 
Policy, 1 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 69 (2002); Philip J. Weiser, Law and Information 
Platforms, 1 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 1 (2002); Kevin Werbach, A Layered Model for 
Internet Policy, 1 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 37, 39-40 (2002); Richard S. Whitt, A 
Horizontal Leap Forward: Formulating a New Communications Public Policy Framework Based 
on the Network Layers Model, 56 FED. COMM. L.J. 587 (2004). 
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facilities-based network providers, in light of their significant market power over first and last mile 
Internet access.   
In contrast, the content and applications layers evidence no marketplace concentration or 
lack of competitive options.  So long as ISPs do not interfere, consumers have complete 
sovereignty in selecting what content, applications and services to access.  Unlike the network 
level, where subscribers lock into one service provider and may have limited facilities-based 
operator options, the content/applications layers evidence robust competition and boundless 
consumer choice.  While consumers may incur significant costs in changing which network 
operator provides service, the switching costs at the applications and content layers approach zero.  
Without constant innovation and acute sensitivity to consumer wants, needs and desires a currently 
successful content or applications provider is just one click away from declining market share and 
insignificance. 
Because the FCC has abandoned functional separation safeguards, 
99 even as other nations 
embrace them as necessary and workable, 
100
                                                 
99    See n. 71, supra.  
 the Commission relies heavily on ISP self-regulation 
 
100    See Government of the United Kingdom, Office of Communications, The International 
Communications Market 2007, Sec.1.3.6 Functional separation (Dec. 2007); available at: 
http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/market-data-research/market-data/communications-market-
reports/cmr07/cm07_print/.  “In most of Europe the connections between customers’ premises and 
telephone exchanges are provided by the incumbent fixed-line telecoms operator. A key objective 
of the regulation of fixed-line networks is to enable fair competition by ensuring that alternative 
operators can get non-discriminatory access to the incumbent’s access network. Under the existing 
EU regulatory framework, this problem is addressed through a range of regulatory access remedies. 
In particular, the incumbent telecom operator is often required to supply wholesale services to rival 
communications providers and to itself on a non-discriminatory basis in order to facilitate fair 
competition in the provision of retail services to homes and businesses. ‘Functional separation’ 
complements these existing measures by placing the monopoly element in a separate business unit. 
This allows any wholesale products and any associated services to be offered to both the 
incumbent's own retail businesses and to those of rivals, on equal terms.” 41 
 
and competitive necessity to prevent content discrimination.  Remarkably, while the FCC remains 
skeptical about the viability of cable television self-regulation and competition, the Commission 
may have overstated the level of true facilities-based broadband Internet access competition. 
In light of real or perceived broadband competition, the FCC has undertaken an aggressive 
deregulatory campaign based on its assumptions and statistical compilations that support an 
inference of robust market penetration and competition in broadband markets.  Advocates for even 
more deregulation regularly cite the Commission’s statistics as evidence that the unfettered 
marketplace can achieve broadband access and affordability goals as well as foreclose the need for 
Internet regulation. 
101
                                                                                                                                                             
While regulators in other EU Member States are considering the merits of functional separation, 
the UK has had more than two years of experience in implementing the remedy. Ofcom accepted 
undertakings under national competition law in September 2005 from BT to place its access and 
backhaul businesses in a separate business unit called ‘Openreach.’  . . . New Zealand has since 
also introduced functional separation and it is under active consideration by several national 
regulators within the EU including those in Italy, Sweden and Poland.”); see also Openreach, 
Keeping the UK Connected; available at: 
  The prospect of regulating Internet-mediated content, applications and 
http://www.openreach.co.uk/orpg/aboutus/Downloads/web_corp_ brochure.pdf. 
 
101    See Federal Trade Commission, Broadband Connectivity Competition Policy, FTC Staff 
Report, 8 (June, 2007); available at: http://www.ftc.gov/reports/broadband/v070000report.pdf 
(“We note that opponents of net neutrality regulation have pointed to evidence on a national scale 
that (1) access speeds are increasing, (2) prices (particularly speed-adjusted or quality adjusted 
prices) are falling, and (3) new entrants, including wireless and other competitors, are poised to 
challenge the incumbent cable and telephone companies. We note, too, that statistical research 
conducted by the FCC has tended to confirm these general trends.”).  However, this report did 
acknowledge that “[b]ecause alternative broadband providers are not perfect substitutes for cable 
or DSL broadband providers, the mere counting of providers using new technologies does not 
answer the question of whether or not they are effective competitive alternatives to cable and 
DSL.” Id. at 104; see also, J. Gregory Sidak, A Consumer-Welfare Approach to Network Neutrality 
Regulation of the Internet, 2 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 349 (2006); Cabletechtalk, The Trouble 
with Broadband Deployment Statistics; available at: http://www.cabletechtalk.com/news-
items/2008/02/06/the-trouble-with-broadband-deployment-statistics/. 42 
 
software juxtaposes with frequent FCC conclusions that the consumers benefit from a robustly 
competitive and unregulated Internet marketplace.  
102
Both the FCC and many stakeholders assume the frequently cited statistics present a true 
picture of the marketplace, but even the Commission has acknowledged that its data collection, 
based on zip codes, lacks granularity,
 
103 and defining broadband using a floor of 200 kilobits per 
second understates the bit rate needed for many broadband services. 
104
                                                 
102    See AT&T Inc. and BellSouth Corporation, Application for Transfer of Control, 22 
F.C.C.R. 5662, 5724-25 (2007) (“[T]here is substantial competition in the provision of Internet 
access services. Broadband penetration has increased rapidly over the last year with more 
Americans relying on high-speed connections to the Internet for access to news, entertainment, and 
communication. Increased penetration has been accompanied by more vigorous competition. 
Greater competition limits the ability of providers to engage in anticompetitive conduct since 
subscribers would have the option of switching to alternative providers if their access to content 
were blocked or degraded.  In particular, cable providers collectively continue to retain the largest 
share of the mass market high speed, Internet access market. Additionally, consumers have gained 
access to more choice in broadband providers.”).  John Kneuer, Former Assistant Secretary for 
Communications and Information and Administrator at the Commerce Department’s National 
Telecommunications and Information Administration claimed in 2008 that the United States “has 
the most effective multiplatform broadband in the world.”  John Kneuer, True or False: U.S.’s 
Broadband Penetration Is Lower Than Even Estonia’s; Answer: True, NEWSWEEK, July 9, 2007, 
at 58, available at 
  Rather than expand its 
http://www.newsweek.com/id/33456/page/2. 
 
103  See Development of Nationwide Broadband Data to Evaluate Reasonable and Timely 
Deployment of Advanced Services to All Americans, Improvement of Wireless Broadband 
Subscribership Data, and Development of Data on Interconnected Voice Over Internet Protocol 
(VoIP) Subscribership, 22 F.C.C.R. 7760, 7765-66 (2007) (“In sparsely populated rural Zip Codes 
this could mean that a given provider has just one broadband subscriber who is located in a small 
town or at some other location convenient to telephone or cable facilities.  Broadband 
“’availability’” could be non-existent for that carrier’s other customers located a few blocks or 
many miles away from that single customer.  In other words, and notwithstanding the value of data 
currently submitted on the Form 477, there is more precise information that we could gather to 
give us a more accurate picture of current broadband deployment.”) , 23 F.C.C.R. 9691(2008), on 
recon., 23 F.C.C.R. 9800 (2008). 
 
104    See Development of Nationwide Broadband Data to Evaluate Reasonable and Timely 
Deployment of Advanced Services to All Americans, Improvement of Wireless Broadband 
Subscribership Data, and Development of Data on Interconnected Voice Over Internet Protocol 
(VoIP) Subscribership, 23 F.C.C.R. 9691, 9700 (2008) (“As many commenters noted, the range of 
information transfer capacities included in the current lowest tier of 200 kbps to 2.5 mbps captures 43 
 
regulatory mission to address phantom issues related to upstream providers of content, the 
Commission would better allocate its time and resources to resolving real Internet access problems. 
Regardless of whether consumers have multiple broadband options available, most 
subscribe to, and are locked into the services of only one carrier.  In the case of wireless broadband 
access, consumers typically agree to one or two year service contracts with financial penalties for 
early termination.  For both wireline and wireless broadband access, subscribers may not have 
many service options and may incur significant switching costs should they learn of discriminatory 
service.  But as the Commission stated in its investigation of Comcast, 
105
V.  Ample Case Law Forecloses the FCC from Leveraging a Public Interest Argument to 
Regulate Content and Application Providers. 
 subscribers may not 
easily detect the source of service degradation even when the underlying carrier engages in 
anticompetitive conduct.   
 
  Providers of content and applications, having no affiliation with downstream ISPs, 
106
                                                                                                                                                             
a wide variety of services, ranging from services capable of transmitting real time video to simple 
always-on connections not suitable for more than basic email or web browsing activities.  We find 
that requiring providers to report data in more detailed speed tiers will better identify services that 
support advanced applications, creating distinctions that reflect different capacities for transmitting 
high quality video and similar high bandwidth communications. We also find that, as technologies 
and services evolve, upload speeds are an increasingly significant aspect of broadband services, 
and increased granularity in reporting both download and upload speed data will assist us in 
understanding the broadband services market.”), on recon., 23 F.C.C.R. 9800 (2008). 
 
qualify for maximum protection from FCC regulation based on traditional First Amendment 
 
105  Comcast Investigation, 23 F.C.C.R. 13028, 13058-59 (2008)(“Many consumers 
experiencing difficulty using only certain applications will not place blame on the broadband 
Internet access service provider, where it belongs, but rather on the applications themselves, thus 
further disadvantaging those applications in the marketplace.”). 
 
106    ISPs that package content in a walled garden have claimed First Amendment speaker status 
even as these carriers also profess to be nothing more than neutral conduits, particularly when they 
can qualify for a “safe harbor” exemption from tort and copyright liability.   
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analysis and the lack of any basis for the Commission to apply the information service 
classification which it has used to justify selective regulatory intervention.  In Reno v. ACLU, 
107 
the Supreme Court considered the Internet a vast medium for the publication of content worthy of 
substantial protection from government regulation even when government presents a compelling 
reason for intervening, e.g., protecting children from the potential harm resulting from access to 
obscene or indecent material. 
108 On several occasions, the Internet’s importance as a mass 
medium of expression trumped legislative efforts to protect children from harmful Internet-
mediated content.
109  These cases offer clear precedent mandating close scrutiny of content-based 
regulations with government bearing a substantial burden of demonstrating that content-affecting 
regulations are narrowly drawn and do not unduly restrict First Amendment protected rights of 
both content providers and consumers. 
110
                                                 
107    Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997)[hereinafter cited as Reno]. 
  
 
108    The Supreme Court considers Internet communications as a publishing activity and 
therefore a core element of First Amendment speaker/publisher rights.  “Any person or 
organization with a computer connected to the Internet can ‘publish’ information.”  Id. at 853. 
 
109    See, e.g., Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656 (2004) (holding that prohibition of commercial 
transmission of material harmful to minors was unconstitutionally overbroad when less restrictive 
alternatives, such as filtering, are readily available). 
 
110    The Supreme Court also stated: “The dramatic expansion of this new marketplace of ideas 
contradicts the factual basis of this contention. The record demonstrates that the growth of the 
Internet has been and continues to be phenomenal. As a matter of constitutional tradition, in the 
absence of evidence to the contrary, we presume that governmental regulation of the content of 
speech is more likely to interfere with the free exchange of ideas than to encourage it. The interest 
in encouraging freedom of expression in a democratic society outweighs any theoretical but 
unproven benefit of censorship.” Reno, 521 U.S. at 885. 
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The Supreme Court has not imposed such a high burden on government when seeking to 
regulate other media such as cable television and broadcasting. 
111
Unlike the Internet, which heretofore has evidenced low barriers to market entry by content 
providers, other media have higher market entry barriers, e.g., the need to install costly 
infrastructure, or to secure a government-granted franchise or license to use public spectrum and 
rights of way.  For these types of media, courts will examine  laws that require FCC interpretation 
and the creation of regulations in the broader context of supporting public policy goals, especially 
ones articulated by Congress, as opposed to a narrower view that the resulting regulations directly 
affect content and the rights of a particular type of speaker, e.g., cable network operators versus 
television broadcasters.   
 First, the Court has evidenced 
greater willingness to consider regulation in terms of achieving economic public policy goals as 
opposed to whether and how they affect speech.  The Court accepted the duty to balance speaker 
rights against other public policy objectives such as promoting widespread access to certain types 
of media, e.g., commercial, advertiser-supported broadcasting.  Second, the Court has 
acknowledged that media have different characteristics that affect accessibility and 
competitiveness.   
The FCC has attempted to frame its regulation of ISPs as having no First Amendment 
consequences whatsoever.  By avoiding any First Amendment analysis, the FCC does not have to 
address whether any form of Internet regulation impacts content providers and their speaker rights.  
                                                 
111  “[U]nlike the Internet, the broadcast medium has traditionally ‘received the most limited 
First Amendment protection.’” Complaints Against Various Licensees Regarding Their Broadcast 
of the Fox Television Network Program “Married By America” on April 7, 2003, Forfeiture Order, 
23 F.C.C.R. 3222 n.74 (2008) (quoting  Reno, 521 U.S. at 867).  In the Reno case, which addressed 
the lawfulness of Internet content regulation designed to protect children from harm, the Court 
supported maximum First Amendment freedom for Internet-based speakers as compared to the 
comparatively less freedom available to broadcasters.   
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Such avoidance also supports the FCC’s goal of having maximum flexibility to justify regulatory 
forbearance in most instances, but conversely to apply selective regulation on an as needed basis, 
even for information service providers.  This pursuit of regulatory options supports the FCC’s 
predisposition not to regulate the Internet while nevertheless reserving the right to do so whenever 
the Commission deems it necessary, despite the First Amendment and case law precedent that 
clearly prohibits such government intervention.  While the FCC might be able to leverage Title I 
ancillary jurisdiction to regulate ISPs under compelling circumstances, the Commission has no 
lawful means to extend such jurisdiction upstream to content providers. 
When confronted with ISP claims that FCC regulation thwarts their First Amendment 
speaker rights, the Commission has sought to frame the matter as lawful extension of a regulatory 
mandate that has no impact on anyone’s First Amendment freedom:  
Nor do we find Time Warner Cable’s analogy of a broadband provider to a 
newspaper to be apt. For one, the Commission is not dictating the content of 
any speech. Nor are we persuaded that Comcast’s customers would attribute 
the content delivered by peer-to-peer applications to Comcast, rather than 
attributing them to the other parties with whom they have chosen to interact 
through those applications. Under these circumstances, we find that our 




The Commission may ignore the First Amendment implications of ISP regulation, but it surely 




 do qualify for First Amendment protection from expanding government 
oversight. 
 
                                                 
112    Comcast Investigation, 23 F.C.C.R. at 13053 n.203.   
 
113    Id. 
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VI.  Conclusions 
 
  Consistent with the FCC’s examination of potential Internet regulatory issues, including the 
Open Internet Order, the network neutrality debate has focused on ISPs and their relationship 
downstream to end users and upstream to content, application and service providers.  While 
stakeholders and researchers differ significantly about whether and how the Commission should 
act, the debate never has included whether the Commission should become a content regulator.  No 
one can credibly claim that the FCC has to remedy some public harm in what has become a quite 
robust marketplace of ideas.  The public harm exists at the ISP level where manipulation of packets 
can occur leading to potential harm to the marketplace of ideas upstream. 
End users have unlimited choices of options, subject to downstream constraints imposed by 
ISPs.  Legitimate ISP network management can and should address instances where specific types 
of content and applications can cause harm to networks, or to individual consumers.  But the need 
to protect a network from spam and congestion, as well as the desire to protect individual 
subscribers from harmful content, does not elevate either an ISP or the FCC into a position of 
censor and content regulator.   
The FCC should take affirmative steps to regulate ISPs in their capacity as gatekeepers, 
bottleneck operators and intermediaries.  The Commission should operate as a referee able to 
resolve disputes and to determine, based on compulsory traffic reports and its own investigative 
powers, whether congestion and legitimate network management, or deliberate and unnecessary 
meddling of subscribers’ traffic has resulted in service degradation.  The FCC should not permit 
ISPs to drop subscribers’ traffic packets to achieve anticompetitive objectives.  However, 
legitimate network management, national security and tiering of customer service might justify 
some type of quality of service and price discrimination.  48 
 
The proper and lawful concern about end user access to the Internet via ISPs does not 
justify a further extension of regulatory oversight to include content and applications.  Doing so 
would reduce the individual and societal benefits that accrue from an open, innovative and robustly 
competitive marketplace for Internet-mediated content and applications. 
  The network neutrality debate seems to encourage provocateurs to raise and legitimize 
outlandish interpretations of law and policy.  The FCC inadvertently may have contributed to 
confusion and uncertainty simply by acting on AT&T’s invitation to consider extending Internet 
policies to content, applications and service providers.  The Commission can contribute to clarity 
and certainty by expressly confirming that its jurisdiction is limited to matters pertaining to Internet 
access and the telecommunications services delivered by ISPs.  
 
 